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CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARSHIP: 
WHAT NEXT? 
As a belated contribution to the Bicentennial, we offer this sym-
posium on the state of constitutional scholarship. Instead of a few 
long articles, we decided to solicit a relatively large number of shorter 
responses. We told each contributor that his evaluation of constitu-
tional scholarship could be general or specific but in either case 
should be brief and informal. 
RICHARD A. POSNER! 
Constitutional scholarship is a weak area of academic law, de-
spite the prominence and prestige of its leading figures. Most of 
what passes for constitutional scholarship is heavily tendentious 
commentary on recent decisions by the Supreme Court. If the 
scholar agrees with the political thrust of the decision, he will go 
easy on its failings of craft; if he disagrees with the political thrust, 
he will not only expose but, more likely than not, exaggerate those 
failings. 
What passes for "theory" in constitutional scholarship is a 
tired debate nominally among different schools of constitutional in-
terpretation, but actually among just two groups, the free interpret-
ers and the loose interpreters, both of which come in left-wing and 
right-wing versions. 
As is now obvious to just about everyone in and out of the legal 
profession, the Supreme Court is a political court, at least so far as 
constitutional law is concerned. Most Justices feel only moderately 
constrained in the constitutional area by text, history, and prece-
dent. They operate most of the time in that area as political actors, 
not as judicial craftsmen in anything like a conventional sense. 
One might therefore think that constitutional scholarship 
would be heavily infused by political science, but one would be in 
error to think so. With rare exceptions such as the late Alexander 
Bickel, constitutional scholars bring to their work the skills and ex-
periences of lawyers, nothing more. Occasionally these scholars 
nevertheless manage to produce remarkable work; an example is 
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John Hart Ely's justly famous book on judicial review. But the oc-
casions are rare, considering the vast spillage of ink every year on 
constitutional commentary. Some constitutional scholars have 
plunged in recent years into the murky depths of moral and polit-
ical philosophy and literary theory, with generally dismal results. 
So protean are these fields of learning in relation to constitutional 
law that each scholar's "theory" is a faithful rendition of his per-
sonal political values. 
How might the situation be improved? I have only one sugges-
tion, and that is a shift in emphasis from normative to positive anal-
ysis. Instead of endless debate over the soundness of recent 
Supreme Court decisions, I recommend disinterested research on 
constitutional law conceived of as a social phenomenon to be stud-
ied, not necessarily to be criticized or changed. Here are some ex-
amples of the type of research that I have in mind: 
1. Studying the effect of the separation of powers on the cost 
and output of public services, the rate of public policy change, and 
the turnover of government officials. Is separation a splendid inno-
vation, or (as the refusal of most foreign nations to imitate it sug-
gests) a hindrance? 
2. Studying the impact of Supreme Court decisions on state 
and local government, on political parties, and on campaigns for 
public office; on the number of defamation suits; on religious diver-
sity; on the crime rate; and on other public and private phenomena 
that constitutional decisions affect. International comparisons 
might be feasible in some cases. For instance, one might compare 
the level of free speech in the U.S. and in Western Europe, and 
consider what this comparison might suggest for the actual effects 
of the free speech clause of the first amendment. The broad ques-
tion at which these examples (and those in paragraph 1) hint is, just 
what difference has our vaunted constitutional system made? Are 
other countries at our level of economic development plagued by 
cruel and unusual punishments, ex post facto laws, bills of attain-
der, etc.? 
3. Analyzing how important it is to have judicial review of 
the constitutionality of legislation. If there were no judicial review 
of federal statutes, would a significant number of unconstitutional 
federal statutes be passed? The experience of England suggests that 
the answer is no. And what about state statutes? Would we have a 
national common market without the "negative" commerce clause? 
4. Explaining the growth in the fraction of cases on the 
Supreme Court's docket that are constitutional cases. 
5. Exploring the impact of Supreme Court constitutional de-
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cisions on public opinion. Did Brown v. Board lead to greater or 
less tolerance of blacks by whites? Did Roe v. Wade reduce or in-
crease public hostility to abortion? Does the Court form or follow 
the values of the public or particular segments of the public? Has 
the Court a constituency to which it caters in its constitutional deci-
sions? Are its decisions at a particular slice in time politically co-
herent, like the platform of a political party? Political scientists 
have paid some attention to these questions; legal scholars, very 
little. 
These and many other questions that could be put are designed 
to draw attention away from endless inconclusive debating over the 
pros and cons of particular decisions and toward a study of consti-
tutional law as a social institution having causes and effects. The 
serious pursuit of these questions would require constitutional 
scholars to equip themselves with new analytical tools, to take a less 
tendentious and political view of their subject, to become more-
scholarly. 
PAUL MURPHY2 
I have been reading a doctoral dissertation which one of my 
Ph.D. advisees is completing and was intrigued with a statement by 
a Kentucky judge, William W. Blair, in 1822: 
Judges ... do not sound the alarm upon any supposed violation of the constitution; 
nor do they claim the right to issue their injunction to arrest legislative proceed-
ings. . . . They do not undertake to declare any statute unconstitutional which can 
be carried into execution without their intervention. . . . It is only when the aid of 
judges is called in to assist in executing (statutes) that they claim the privilege of 
examining into the constitutionality of such enactments. They refuse to lend their 
assistance and to become participes criminals in a violation of the constitution; they 
deny to the legislature the power to compel them to become agents in the perpetua-
tion of a crime. Surely this is not an assumption of superiority, but rather an asser-
tion of equality .... 
Looking at constitutional scholarship from the perspective of a con-
stitutional historian, the quote suggests a number of needs. Since 
the "constitutional revolution" of the late 1930s and especially since 
the mandate of Harlan Fiske Stone to the Court in his famous foot-
note 4 in the Carolene Products case of 1938, to focus upon the 
"care and feeding" of the rights of "discrete and insular minorities," 
constitutional historians have tended mainly to follow the Court in 
its gradually reoriented concern for civil liberties and civil rights. 
All to the good. But as a result there have been some casualties of 
underemphasis and underconcern. Stone, as you will recall, urged 
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